Congress has been reminded that the national budget is not a wish list, a political buffet, or an ATM where lawmakers can increase the withdrawal limit simply because the money looks lonely.
In striking down the P449.5-billion increase in unprogrammed appropriations in the 2024 budget and the P17.99-billion increase in the 2025 Special Road Fund, the Supreme Court delivered a message that should not require a constitutional law degree to understand.
Congress cannot spend beyond the President’s proposed budget ceiling just because it has the votes, the venue, and a bicameral conference committee willing to do the paperwork.
The problem is not unprogrammed appropriations themselves. Governments need financial flexibility for genuine emergencies and unforeseen needs. But there is a difference between keeping money in reserve and keeping the public in the dark. Contingent funds are supposed to be a safety net, not a secret trapdoor through which billions can disappear into projects that conveniently emerge after the budget has been approved.
Then there is SAGIP, an allocation that effectively allowed the Executive to identify projects and decide where the money would go after Congress had enacted the budget. Apparently, some lawmakers thought their job was to approve the money and let someone else figure out what it was for. That is not budgeting. That is passing the bill before deciding what was ordered.
The bicameral conference committee deserves particular scrutiny. Its mandate is to reconcile disagreements between the House and Senate, not manufacture new spending opportunities behind closed doors. When billions are added without adequate records, explanations, or supporting documents, the public is left with a rather expensive guessing game. If the changes are defensible, why the secrecy? If they are legitimate, why the missing paperwork?
The ruling may frustrate lawmakers who mistake legislative authority for unlimited discretion. But the power of the purse is not the power to ignore the rules governing the purse. Congress writes the budget, but it does not own the Treasury. The money belongs to taxpayers, who deserve more than creative accounting dressed up as legislative compromise.
Nor does the Court’s application of the doctrine of operative fact to certain completed programs amount to a blanket pardon. Good-faith beneficiaries may be protected, but officials do not automatically escape civil, criminal, or administrative liability. Public money does not become private forgiveness simply because it has already been spent.
Ultimately, the Court has done what constitutional guardrails are supposed to do. It has stopped fiscal flexibility from becoming fiscal freelancing.
Congress can debate priorities, scrutinize proposals, and demand accountability from the Executive. What it cannot do is treat the President’s budget ceiling as a polite suggestion and the bicameral process as a convenient backdoor.
The national budget is not Monopoly money. And Congress, despite its impressive collection of titles, committees, and microphones, does not get to change the rules halfway through the game.
